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The attack in Norway, like every attack with a 
major impact, should and will be carefully analy-
zed, both by police and by terrorists. If the Nor-
wegian authorities have officially called for a 
technical evaluation of Counter-terrorism (CT) 
and rescue national services, many sensitive as-
pects still remain unsure: 
The profile and motivations of Anders Breivik 
Behring will be highly debated, and almost sure-
ly politically exploited. In particular, time will 
tell, because this attack probably crystallized in 
Europe the first major violent answer to what 
some people on the political fringes, among the 
heterogeneous networks of the radical and non-
democrat far-rightists, see as an existential 
threat – e.g. multiculturalism. However, these 
tragic events cannot only be perceived in this 
way. Above all, the operational planning, as pre-
sented in the now famous book titled 2083 – A 
European declaration of independence, seems 
unprecedented. It presents and analyzes in a 
particularly structured way, the protocol used by 
Breivik to prepare his attack. This is displayed 
from the initial idea, to the training, testing, the 
search for precursors (explosive, ammo, indivi-
dual ceramic body suits), etc., and to the opera-
tional phase itself, including elements of action 
vis-a-vis a possible SWAT team counter-strike. 
The author very likely studied recent terrorist 
events (cells dismantling and failed or successful 
attacks). Most impressive, the systematic way he 
thinks about (and describes in his book) concre-
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te means to hide his preparatory activities will 
most likely be seen as a sort of model for copy 
cats („Stealthy process‟). Truly, the possibility to 
reproduce such a terrorist attack seems to be the 
most serious problem. 
Lastly, the Norwegian police behaviour does not 
appear to have been particularly adequate. This 
country does not appear to have a strong opera-
tional security culture. 
 
Profile and motivations 
This aspect is obviously the most interesting for 
the media. It is probable that there is not here 
any simple answer. 
 
Lone-wolf and Leaderless resistance?  
The solitary dimension of Breivik, if it is confir-
med, could be indicative of several aspects: First, 
an operational loneliness directly coming from 
white supremacists‟ practices. This aspect, which 
needs to be assessed in-depth, is rather a com-
mon practice among violent supremacists' net-
works. Two concepts, defined in the U.S., sum-
marize this attitude: Lone wolf terrorism and « 
leaderless resistance » which underlines the 
absence of pyramidal structure in a terrorist or-
ganization, and implies autonomous cells (this 
can also be observed for jihadism). 
 
The “lone wolf” concept seems well-shaped for 
representing white supremacist terrorism. It can 
be defined with four main criteria: 
 
(a) Individual action 
(b) No membership to an organized and terro-
rist entity or network 
(c) No leader or hierarchy 
(d) Individual conception of planning, tactic 
and attack 
 
Some elements of « leaderless resistance » emer-
ged at the beginning of the 1970s. Joseph Tom-
masi, founder of the National Socialist Libera-
tion Front (NSLF) in 1974, encourage people „to 
act resolutely and alone‟ against the state. This 
contradicted the Marxist organizational model of 
terrorist organizations at that time. The white 
supremacist Louis Beam, a former Ku Klux Klan 
and Aryan Nations member, popularised the 
concept. He published a book championing lea-
derless resistance as a tactic to countervail the 
destruction by law enforcement agencies of pyra-
midal American militias. His opinion was one 
where „all individuals and groups operate inde-
pendently of each other, and never report to a 
central headquarters‟ or leader – single or collec-
tive - for direction or instruction. For the lone-
wolf concept, Beam credited Cold War anti-
Communist Colonel Julius Louis Amoss, who, in 
the early 1960s, defined the strategy as a defense 
against a Communist takeover of the United Sta-
tes. 
In the late 1990s white supremacists Tom Metz-
ger and Alex Curtis popularized the term „lone 
wolf‟. They envisioned lone-wolf and small-cell 
activism to be considerably more difficult to de-
tect and consequently, to dismantle than other 
forms of terrorism. Curtis encouraged acting alo-
ne in committing violent and heinous crimes so 
that they would not incriminate others. Both 
men recognized the opportunities the Internet 
offered for the dissemination of information and 
the communication with fellow militants. 
The most famous example of “leaderless resis-
tance”/”lone wolves attack," until Oslo attacks, is 
certainly the attack perpetrated against the Al-
fred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma 
City on April 19, 1995, by T. McVeigh and Terry 
Nichols. It must be noticed that the explosive 
devices used in both cases are pretty much simi-
lar (ANFO based). Having said that, it is certain-
ly necessary to verify by a principle of precaution 
if the entity that Breivik claimed to have created 
with others in 2002 throughout Europe and 
North America, is a fantasy or something more 
substantial.  
 
Unabomber type?  
The manifesto published by Breivik, is essential-
ly a narcissist opuscule composed by a self-
taught individual. It obviously, and a bit superfi-
cially, mimics the pamphlet made by another 
bloody individual, but from another political 
fringe - Theodore Kaczynski (a.k.a. „The Una-
bomber„). Kaczynski, truly a very dissociated 
personality, perceived as schizophrenic by many 
authoritative experts, was responsible for plac-
ing or mailing 16 package bombs and letter 
bombs over a period of nearly 18 years. For six 
years, between 1987 and 1993, Kaczynski re-
mained inactive. In June 1993 he restarted his 
bomb campaign. His final attack came on 24 
April 1995, when a package bomb sent to the of-
fices of the California Forestry Association killed 
the association‟s president. Such comparison has 
evident limits: the modus operandi and the se-
lected targets are very different. 
However, both Unabomber and Breivik have pu-
blished and disseminated their manifesto. The 
one made by Breivik is far more structured and 
ambitious, in particular, concerning ways and 
means. And once again, their vision (used here is 
a quasi-mystical sense) is very different, and 
even opposed, Kaczynski being essentially a sort 
of green-anarchist. 
Breivik‟s manifesto is huge and according to his 
author, a compendium of references, articles and 
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opinions coming from various rightist / (neo-) 
conservatives or nationalists authors or organi-
zations. Their analysis provides precious infor-
mation on Breivik radical opinions. First, it must 
be admitted that, among political pamphlets, 
many that are disseminated among far-rightists 
networks and communities, are much less struc-
tured, informed, and are blatantly racist or plain 
insulting. 2083 is truly a naive book in many 
ways. It is also a symptomatic mix: it is indica-
tive of a post 9-11 vision of the world and of 
Europe, based on an eschatological perception of 
the Western world or civilization decline. Its ref-
erences are essentially post-9-11, mostly neo-
conservative, or even pro-Israel. It considers Is-
lam as a religion that is, in essence, violent and 
expansionist (Daniel Pipes, the MEMRI and Ji-
hadwatch are largely quoted). Furthermore, 
they also consider Europe as a decadent conti-
nent, overwhelmed by a radical and dynamic Is-
lam (Bat Ye‟or Eurabia). For that reason, Breivik 
cannot be considered as a neo-nazi. He writes 
somewhere else in his book that Hitler and Nazis 
can actually be criticized for what they did, and 
that forbids probably forever the Europeans to 
act vigorously against minorities. 
2083 is also full of anti-European Union, anti-
federalist and anti-Brussels stances. For instan-
ce, the EU is seen as a general and well-
orchestrated process of multiculturalization of 
the Old continent: 
 
“Why the EU needs to be  
destroyed and soon." 
 
“The EU court of Justice in  
Strasbourg is a cultural Marxist 
Controlled political entity" ( p. 338). 
 
Classically, for a far-rightist pamphlet, every-
thing that reminds of a worldwide government is 
highly criticized: 
 
“Boycott the UN" (p. 329). 
 
“EUSSR. “  
 
This claim to return to a more traditional sove-
reignty system, based on States, and correlative-
ly to the European integration enhancement, is 
maybe an emerging vision in Europe. It is fur-
thermore, in a symmetric way to anti-federalist 
currents in the U.S., a paradoxocal sign of suc-
cess for the E.U. Like Washington, D.C., a capital 
sometimes viewed as full of corrupted bureau-
crats, Brussels is also denounced as a kind of so-
cial-democrat, multiculturalist Babylon. (For 
that reason, a comparison between Breivik and 
McVeigh is pertinent here).  
The author also seems to be particularly sensiti-
ve to what he perceives as the decline of masculi-
nity in the Western man, due to feminism. 
It is interesting to note that he appears less inte-
rested by migrants and Muslims, than by those 
he considers as responsible of the situation he 
denounces, e.g. leftist political parties, social-
democrats, « progressists » and « immigratio-
nist » intellectuals. That could largely explain, 
with operational necessities, Breivik‟s  target 
choice – a meeting of young social-democrat mi-
litants rather than, let‟s say, a mosque. 
Breivik specific ideology is certainly representa-
tive, at the end, of what radical and violent far-
rightism is:  A heterogeneous mix of diversified 
beliefs and ideologies – Paneuropeanism, odi-
nism (the cult of Scandinanian gods), white su-
premacy, anti-Marxism, anti-federalism, free-
masonry symbolism, anti-democracy, racism, a 
surprising papism, coupled with typical neo-con 
post 9-11 fears and perceptions and an obvious 
fetishism for weaponry and knights/crusaders 
aesthetic. 
 
Suicide by cop?  
The motivations of terrorists are not easy to ana-
lyze; the general and traditional reason being the 
word « terrorism » itself. This term can be pejo-
rative by defining and disqualifying these acts as 
the “violence of the other." Different researchers 
have tried to analyze terrorism, in particular 
Crelinsten, Crenshaw, Della Porta, Gurr, Ross 
and Sprinzak. Even though Gurr ignores psycho-
logy and group dynamics, Crenshaw, in her in-
troduction of Terrorism in Context, considers 
that the causal analysis of terrorist acts is com-
plex, and it implied psychological considera-
tions, internal bargaining inside and actors‟ inte-
ractions inside or outside the terrorist organiza-
tion. Ross tries to link “structural causes” (i.e. 
socio-cultural) to psychological factors within a 
complex model. Della Porta has mainly studied 
the radicalization process of the European post-
1968 movement (Red Brigades, Rote Armee 
Fraktion or the French Action Directe) by focu-
sing on environmental (sociological) and group 
dynamics.. Crelinsten developed an analysis of 
terrorism as a way of political communication, 
between the State, which “controls," and 
“controlled” (the protestors and infra-state 
groups). It is obvious that terrorist political orga-
nization‟s members do not obviously have a uni-
que motivation.  On the contrary, each of these 
organizations is founded on specific doctrines 
and sociocultural basis and recruit or mobilizes 
militants and sympathizers with specific socio-
cultural profiles. For example, numerous psy-
chological studies on prominent members of the 
Red Army Fraction (R.A.F.) showed very par-
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ticular profiles: most of them had distant or con-
flicting links with their parents, particularly the 
father. The terrorist group provided them a 
unique way of socialization. The R.A.F. produced 
a kind of “collective-Self” in which immature 
personalities could aggregate themselves. A 
study about Italian terrorism concluded that 
from 1969 to 1980, 2,017 individuals had been 
indicted for terrorist acts in Italy. 55 % of them 
were far leftist, 45 % far rightist. The authors 
tried to distinguish a few psychological constants 
of the far rightist terrorists: “stereotyped social 
behaviors" (?), ambiguities concerning authority, 
weak intelligence, self-destructive and destruc-
tive pulsions, superstitions, weapons fetishist 
perceptions and adhesion to a culture of vio-
lence. Interestingly, some of these aspects could 
be applied to Breivik. 
Another concept might probably be evoked by 
his lawyer, because it implies psychological (and 
thus penal) irresponsibility. The “suicide by cop” 
is a classical concept of American criminology 
defined as: “Those criminal homicides in which 
the victim is a direct, positive precipitator in the 
crime. The role of the victim is characterized by 
his having been the first in the homicide drama 
to use physical force directed against his subse-
quent slayer. The victim-precipitated cases are 
those in which the victim was the first to show 
and use a deadly weapon, to strike a blow in an 
altercation – in short, the first to commence the 
interplay of resort to physical violence." This 
concept, moreover, is rather close to that of 
Amok developed earlier by Sigmund Freud, star-
ting from the analysis of suicide by provocation, 
of Indonesian origin. This indirect suicidal ten-
dency does not always imply the death for the 
individual who commits such a violent act, espe-
cially if the local police do not have an operatio-
nal culture of shooting, which seems to be the 
case in Norway. However, in fine, which is a de-
cisive attitude, Breivik is reputed to have surren-
dered to police forces, without trying to menace 
(and be killed by) them. 
His book also makes a clear distinction between 
suicide and martyrdom (2083, p.1347) 
(However, it might be a way to “intellectualize” 
some suicidal tendencies). Furthermore, he 
claims that the post-attack phase should be care-
fully considered for propaganda reasons, not ta-
king into account that he could be placed into 
isolation by the police. 
 
Operational and pre-operational 
aspects 
In terms of terrorism practices, it can be said 
that this attack, considering the number of vic-
tims, belongs to the emerging and worrying cate-
gory of massive urban terrorism. The ratio 
number of terrorist(s) to victims is significantly 
higher than those of the Mumbay attack (164 
deaths,. 30 wounded by 10 gunmen). Unfortu-
nately, this indicates a good accuracy of the 
means used against the selected target, at least 
for the sniping part of the attack. 
 
It is also fundamentally new and innovative by 
the very structured and detailed description of 
Oslo attacks' modus operandi. 2083 is a sort of 
Internet free handbook, easily accessible (See 
Breivik allegedly 5,000 Facebook contacts, 
2083, p.1418), especially among sympathizers, 
and above…. 
Pre-operational and operational elements and 
considerations presented in the book seem to 
conform to what happened during Oslo attacks. 
Specific facts still need to be conformed, such as 
whether Breivik added a pure and highly toxic 
form of nicotine to the bullets, for the purpose of 
raising lethality. 
The following two elements seem particularly 
impressive to the authors: 
 
The culture of secrecy and adapta-
bility during the planning and prepara-
tory phases (including by active measures, 
such as creating two companies for justify-
ing and hiding the purchase of explosive 
precursors), the rational, discrete and me-
thodical research in foreign countries, and 
online, of products that Breivik identified 
as necessary. The search for a weapon 
seems to have been naive and amateurish 
(if, again, the assertions contained in 2083 
are true) – a purchase attempt on the black 
marked in Prague, and possibly, a pur-
chase in Norway or elsewhere? Norway has 
a large population of hunters. Semi-
automatic and bolt action rifles, as well as 
shotguns, make up the better part of the 
guns in civilian homes. There is a total ban 
on automatic weapons for civilians, unless 
they fall into the collector category, by the 
Firearm Weapons Act, with a new secon-
dary law in effect 1 July 2009 providing 
more detailed regulation. Modification of 
semi-automatic guns into fully automatic 
without the consent of the police is a felony 
crime. 
A systematic evaluation of every 
steps and preparatory acts, their ad-
vantages and perceived inconvenients, the 
difficulties and challenges that Breivik 
faced, the mistakes he identified. For the 
moment, in the aftermath of Oslo attack, 
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Breivik seems to have found a breach in 
the existing security measures and counter
-terrorism sensitivity and detection capac-
ity. Every nation‟s CT services will have 
soon to « test » their own system with 
Breivik approach, by a necessary principle 
of precaution. 
 
This attack in obviously a massive failure for the 
Norwegian authorities (detection failure, preven-
tion failure, SWAT team transportation delays, 
neutralization/arrest delays). While Norway has 
a deradicalization programme for its local far-
rightists violent extremists and skinheads, this 
country failed to detect Breivik while he was ac-
tive onlines in chatrooms, and probably in real 
life. The rescue phase did not seem particularly 
well-managed either, at least on some specific 
aspects. 
The following key elements are intended to pro-
vide a first analysis of lessons learned, based on 
an incomplete knowledge. 
 
Lessons learned 
 
Norwegian police – Organization  
and main characteristics 
The Norwegian police, with about 13,000 offi-
cers and other staffers, is organized in 27 re-
gional districts and 7 national units. Each re-
gional district, with a certain administrative and 
budgetary autonomy, has specialized units, mo-
bile forces, including a SWAT team, able to act to 
neutralize individuals or in CT operations. Most 
of the time, Police officers do not carry any 
weapons, even though they can have one, in par-
ticular, in patrolling cars. The use of a weapon is 
highly restricted. The Norwegian police is re-
puted to have opened fire 79 times between 1994 
and 2004. 
Each regional district has an emergency calls 
system able to respond to public calls and to mo-
bilize and coordinate rescue means (Firefighters 
and Emergency Medical Services (EMS)). 
On a national level, an air unit, based in Oslo 
and depending on this regional district, has two 
helicopters that can be used, when it is neces-
sary, by special units from other districts. One, 
with optical systems, is mostly used for monitor-
ing and surveillance. The other is for transporta-
tion, but has a very limited capacity (4 passen-
gers). 
 
Norwegian rescue services and  
crisis management organization 
The firefighters, at the local or intercity levels, 
are responsible for rescuing populations. The 
operational direction for security and rescue 
during large public events is organized by an in-
terservices cooperation, from security to medical 
emergency teams, under the police leadership. 
Crisis management is based on the capacity to 
bring together different public actors, NGOs and 
even private means, if necessary. Such organiza-
tion, appealing in theory, has been regularly 
criticized in Norway.:  In practice, like in other 
countries, interservices cooperation has occa-
sionally been very challenging and produced un-
equal results. 
 
Police and EMS intervention  
on Utoya island 
The difficulties seem to have stem primarily 
from three causes: 
The first one is related to the time of interven-
tion by police forces. The Oslo Police seems to 
have been overwhelmed by the bombing in Oslo, 
in spite of many calls from the island, including 
from the terrorist himself. Too many minutes 
were needed, and wasted, before someone un-
derstood that a massive sniping attack was oc-
curring elsewhere. This is certainly indicative of 
a lack of knowledge and training on redundant 
terrorist attacks among the Norwegian security 
community. One of the shooting victims was a 
(unarmed) police officer. A lost opportunity, this 
officer could have provided some credible and 
actionable information. 
The relative isolation of Utoya Island strongly 
limited rapid deployment response, and seems 
to demonstrate that Norwegian SWAT teams did 
not have, at least at that moment, appropriate 
means of transportation and projection. They 
symptomatically used very basic boats provided 
by private citizens. This highlights for sure some 
under-dimensioned capacities of the Norwegian 
SWAT counter-terrorism teams. It must be no-
ticed that the arrest phase benefited from favor-
able circumstances, since Breivik spontaneously 
surrounded.  
The last one is related to the official assessment 
of the victims' number. In particular, the deaths 
estimate gradually decreased from 92 (22/07/11) 
to 77 (29/07/11). This demonstrates incontesta-
bly an organizational failure in centralizing in-
formation, and a lack of coordination between 
the field and the upper levels. 
 
Conclusion – Next steps?  
After such bloody attacks, any CT service will try 
to assess what happened in Norway and will ex-
pect to receive actionable intelligence from Nor-
way. We can assume that part of the exchange of 
information will be on a) the modus operandi 
details and b) possible international connections 
or supports. 
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Norwegian CT services did not estimate as highly 
probable a terrorist attack by radical and violent 
far-rightist activists. Open sources also men-
tioned that they received some signs of Breivik‟s 
efforts to buy small quantity of chemical precur-
sors. They did not see the inherent danger of his 
activity, partly because of the size and the low-
cost of the purchases, but also by reason of the 
systematic security measures taken by him – he 
created operational invisibility. Finally, it is pos-
sible that the whole Norwegian security commu-
nity was simply looking elsewhere, e.g. global 
jihad. 
 
This tragic event demonstrates how analysis is a 
sensitive and complicated process. It certainly 
also indicates how the scenario- based ap-
proaches, which tend to « predict » violent be-
haviours and terrorist practices from specific 
groups and individuals, in a routine way, can be 
counter-productive, and even dangerous. Breivik 
just proves how a very organized and determined 
individual, both methodical and prudent, is per-
fectly able to perform a major terrorist attack, 
without raising suspicion. This truth is disturb-
ing. It should help us to favor operational an-
swers based on multiple capacity means, both 
mobile and largely adaptative. Any CT SWAT 
team should have sufficient and permanent 
(24/7) projection means (air, road, sea). 
 
Furthermore, detection and the definition of 
sensitive and accurate indicators should obvi-
ously be reassessed after Oslo attack. 
 
Emergency rescues teams and firefighters should 
always be able to provide a verified/confirmed 
casualty toll, in order to avoid any detrimental 
imprecision. 
 
Finally, it is essential to be prepared against a) 
simultaneous attacks against multiple targets, 
and b) second or redundant strike against rescue 
teams. It is also necessary to disseminate that 
operational culture among the first-line workers.
Assertions and opinions in this paper are solely those 
of the author (s) and do not necessarily reflect the 
views of the Center for Transatlantic Relations or the 
Fondation pour la Recherche Strategique 
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